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Abstract: We investigate real investment, financial revenues and profits in formerly domestic 
firms once they enter a multinational entity (MNE) through an acquisition. We argue that fol-
lowing the acquisition, those targets are tax-optimized in a profit shifting context if they are 
acquired by MNEs with no controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules in their headquarters’ 
countries. In this case, we hypothesize that MNE-wide profit shifting opportunities decrease 
high-tax targets’ cost of capital, which may have a positive effect on real investment of these 
targets. In addition, we hypothesize that financial revenues respectively profits of low-tax tar-
gets increase after the acquisition, since they may become destinations of profit shifting them-
selves. In line with the effects on real investment, profits of high-tax targets should decline. We 
find evidence for the effects on real investment. Further, these effects can no longer be observed 
in case of existing CFC rules in the acquirer’s headquarters’ country. This finding may suggest 
that CFC rules effectively mitigate MNE-wide profit shifting which in turn has detrimental 
investment effects. We also find some evidence for the expected effects for financial revenues 
but not for the profit measure. 
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1. Introduction and motivation 
We investigate investment and profit shifting in firms after they have been acquired by a foreign 
firm. Such cross-border acquisitions are an important form of FDI as in 2016, 52% of global 
foreign direct investment (FDI), i.e., about 828 billion USD, were conducted via such acquisi-
tions, respectively mergers (M&As)1 (UNCTAD (2017)). Further, cross-border acquisitions 
comprise several advantages for the acquirer and target such as tax avoidance opportunities 
(e.g., Belz et al. (2016)). In particular, if a formerly domestic target in a high-tax country be-
comes part of a multinational entity (MNE), this target may shift profits to low-tax affiliates 
within the MNE after the acquisition.2 Thereby, the tax burden for economic activity of this 
high-tax target and, consequently, its cost of capital decreases, which may enhance investment 
incentives in this target.3 On the other hand, a target in a low-tax country could serve as a 
recipient of shifted profits. Hence, by acquiring such a low-tax target, the MNE may gain en-
hanced profit shifting opportunities. 
However, countries try to prevent profit shifting by anti tax avoidance measures. One such 
measure are controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules, which are implemented in several 
countries worldwide. These rules lead to an immediate taxation of low-tax subsidiaries’ profits 
in the MNE’s headquarters’ country. Consequently, profit shifting opportunities of an MNE 
with its headquarters in a country with effective CFC rules (in the following referred to as “CFC 
rule MNE”) are substantially reduced compared to an MNE with no CFC rules in its headquar-
ters’ country (in the following referred to as “non-CFC rule MNE”). Those theoretical consid-
erations serve as the starting point of our analysis: We investigate whether investment increases 
if a formerly domestic target from a high-tax country enters an MNE, which could be the con-
sequence of the lowered cost of capital. Correspondingly, as mentioned above, targets in coun-
tries with especially low tax rates may become destinations for profit shifting. Therefore, we 
analyze whether profits decline with an increasing tax rate. Finally, we investigate whether the 
                                                 
1 In case of an M&A, two firms either join in one firm (merger) or one firm is acquired by another firm (acquisi-
tion), i.e., it becomes a subsidiary of the acquirer. There is no balance sheet information given on merged firms 
because they become part of other firms. Hence, we can only observe investment in acquired firms. 
2 Formerly domestic targets are defined as firms that are stand-alone firms or that belong to a group of firms that 
are all from the same country before the acquisition. 
3 Cost of capital is the minimum pre-tax rate of return on an investment required by the investor (Devereux and 
Griffith (1998)). For a detailed explanation of this argumentation, see Section 2.1. 
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presence of CFC rules (which are targeted against such profit shifting) in an acquiring MNE 
has an effect on those potential outcomes.  
We base our analysis on a cross-border acquisition sample from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr and 
Amadeus databases. We look at real investment of targets by analyzing the development of 
property, plant and equipment (PPE) following the acquisition. Profit shifting is investigated 
via financial revenues and earnings before taxes (EBT) per PPE. We consider acquisitions in 
the period from 2008 to 2013. 
We contribute to existing research on the effect of profit shifting and CFC rules on investment 
(e.g., Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) or Egger and Wamser (2015)) particularly by considering 
the whole picture of profit shifting in one sample: the effect of tax rates on the distribution of 
profits within an MNE and the effect of those profit shifting opportunities on real investment 
(see Section 2.2 for a detailed discussion). 
Our results show that high-tax targets acquired by non-CFC rule MNEs increase their invest-
ment in PPE after the acquisition. We explain this result by MNE-wide profit shifting opportu-
nities that decrease the high-tax targets’ cost of capital relatively more than low-tax targets’ 
cost of capital. Regarding acquisitions of CFC rule MNEs, in line with our assumptions, we do 
not find a significant effect due to a lack of profit shifting opportunities. Correspondingly, we 
find an increase in financial revenues in low-tax targets, which supports the assumption of fi-
nancial profits being shifted to low-tax subsidiaries within the MNE (though we find this effect 
only for the overall sample and not for non-CFC rule MNEs in particular). Finally, this effect 
cannot be observed for our second measure of profit shifting, EBT per PPE.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the liter-
ature and develops our hypotheses, followed by information on our data in Section 3. Section 
4 presents our empirical approach. Graphical analyses, regression results and extensions are 
discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 sets forth our conclusions. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Literature review on profit shifting and CFC rules 
A vast amount of empirical research finds evidence that MNEs engage in tax-motivated profit 
shifting (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven (2008); Weichenrieder (2009); Grubert (2012); Dharmapala 
and Riedel (2013)). The basic idea is that profits generated in high-tax subsidiaries are shifted 
to low-tax subsidiaries to avoid taxation in high-tax countries. One common profit shifting 
strategy is locating debt in high-tax subsidiaries (e.g., Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001); Desai et 
al. (2004); Huizinga et al. (2008); Buettner and Wamser (2013); Miniaci et al. (2014)), which 
leads to interest expenses in those subsidiaries and corresponding interest income in low-tax 
subsidiaries. Another profit shifting strategy is setting transfer prices for intragroup transactions 
in a way that high-tax subsidiaries have to pay high prices to low-tax subsidiaries. This is par-
ticularly conducted by locating intellectual property (IP) in low-tax countries or countries with 
favorable IP tax treatment (e.g., Dischinger and Riedel (2011); Karkinsky and Riedel (2012); 
Griffith et al. (2014)). That way, high-tax subsidiaries pay royalties for using the IP leading 
again to expenses in high-tax subsidiaries and income in low-tax subsidiaries.4 Taken together, 
these strategies reduce taxable income in high-tax subsidiaries and, consequently, reduce the 
MNE’s overall tax burden. Although Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) find that transfer pric-
ing respectively profit shifting via royalties seems to be the dominant profit shifting channel; 
yet, in general, both profit shifting channels are relevant.  
The focus of this paper will be on profit shifting after acquisitions in cases where a formerly 
domestic target is acquired by a non-CFC rule MNE. Hence, the target, which could not shift 
profits before, enters an MNE, which could generally engage in group-wide profit shifting. 
Consequently, in the years following the acquisition, the target may be tax-optimized in a profit 
shifting context. Belz et al. (2016) have already provided general evidence for this reasoning 
by showing that formerly domestic targets experience a decrease in their effective tax rates by 
up to 8% following an acquisition by an MNE.  
In addition to profit shifting, we are also interested in the change of investment after acquisi-
tions. We expect that the investment effect is a consequence of profit shifting: a decrease in the 
                                                 
4 In addition, these royalty payments can be manipulated in a tax-optimal way with relative ease since objective 
market prices usually do not exist for those IP transfer prices. 
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effective tax rate also affects the target’s cost of capital. The cost of capital denotes the mini-
mum pre-tax rate of return of an investment required by the investor (Devereux and Griffith 
(1998)). The cost of capital increases with an increasing tax burden of the real investment rela-
tive to the alternative (i.e., capital market) investment available to the investor. Therefore, once 
a target enters a non-CFC rule MNE, its cost of capital may decrease since its (effective) tax 
burden may decrease due to the above-mentioned profit shifting opportunities. This reasoning 
is supported by theoretical work of Desai et al. (2006) who show that MNEs with investments 
in tax havens have lower cost of capital in non-tax havens. Consequently, as Dharmapala (2008) 
points out, the existence of tax havens can lead to an increase in investment in non-tax havens. 
Empirical evidence for this reasoning is provided by Overesch (2009). He shows for high-tax 
German subsidiaries that real investment in these subsidiaries increases with a rising tax rate 
differential between the German subsidiary and the direct owner’s home country. He argues 
that this is due to profit shifting out of Germany to the direct owner’s country, which decreases 
the subsidiary’s cost of capital. 
A large number of countries have implemented CFC rules that target against MNE-wide profit 
shifting strategies. These rules lead to an immediate taxation of low-tax subsidiary’s profits in 
the MNE’s headquarters’ country. Thereby, the typical profit shifting strategies as described 
above become generally ineffective within CFC rule MNEs, which may also affect the above 
mentioned investment effects. For CFC rules to be applicable, certain requirements have to be 
fulfilled, which depend on the set up of those rules in the respective countries. Common re-
quirements are ownership (for the German CFC rules, e.g., the German parent has to hold more 
than 50% of the shares or voting rights in the foreign subsidiary), the profits have to be passive 
income (e.g., income from financial portfolio investment or loans to affiliated firms) and the 
tax rate in the country has to be low (e.g., less than 25%). Variations in the design of CFC rules 
are, e.g., the inclusion of also active income or the general applicability of CFC rules except for 
some countries (‘Whitelist’).  
Some empirical studies have already considered the effect of CFC rules on profit shifting be-
havior of MNEs. Altshuler and Hubbard (2003) investigate US CFC rules that were tightened 
in the Tax Reform Act 1986. They find that after 1986 US investment in financial service sub-
sidiaries was no longer responsive to differences in host country tax rates with other subsidiar-
ies. In other words, tax planning opportunities with profit shifting vehicles in low-tax countries 
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were substantially reduced. In 1997, however, the US introduced the so-called check-the-box 
regulation, which may allow for an escape from CFC rules for US MNEs. Indeed, several stud-
ies (e.g., Altshuler and Grubert (2006); Mutti and Grubert (2009)) show that US CFC rules 
became largely ineffective in combatting profit shifting of US MNEs after 1997. Ruf and 
Weichenrieder (2012) investigate German CFC rules and find that these rules effectively reduce 
passive investment, i.e., financial portfolio investment and loans to affiliated firms, in low-tax 
countries. In a subsequent study, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) investigate the effects of the 
Cadbury-Schweppes ruling of the European Court of Justice in 2006 on passive investment of 
German MNEs. The ruling triggered a mitigation of the application of CFC rules within the 
European Economic Area (EEA). The authors find evidence for a relative increase in passive 
investment in low-tax EEA subsidiaries and a parallel decrease in passive investment in non-
EEA subsidiaries. Holzmann (2014) finds that profit shifting by placing debt in high-tax coun-
tries increases in the absence of binding CFC rules (after the Cadbury-Schweppes ruling). Over-
all, these studies provide evidence that the presence of CFC rules reduces profit shifting oppor-
tunities of MNEs. Belz (2015) finds that CFC rules may be an appropriate instrument to elimi-
nate shifting real economic activity to low-tax countries if they cover also active income, i.e., 
such real economic activity. In particular, he analyzes investment in total assets and the number 
of employees following acquisitions of formerly domestic targets by MNEs and finds signifi-
cant effects for total assets and employee number. Finally, Egger and Wamser (2015) show that 
German MNEs, whose subsidiaries are subject to CFC rules, have significantly lower fixed 
assets than subsidiaries who are not subject to CFC rules. They conclude that binding CFC rules 
lead to a sharp increase in cost of capital. 
2.2. Research question, contribution and hypotheses development 
We address the questions whether real investment in firms increases due to profit shifting op-
portunities, whether financial revenues respectively profits of low-tax targets increase, given 
that they potentially become destinations of profit shifting themselves and whether CFC rules 
are effective in avoiding such profit shifting. We focus on targets that were domestic before the 
acquisition, i.e., we consider only targets that were not tax-optimized in a profit shifting context 
before the acquisition. We consider real investment (measured by PPE) and different measures 
of profit shifting (financial revenues and EBT per PPE) in our analyses. When considering PPE, 
we indirectly also measure potential profit shifting, since we identify the part of the change of 
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PPE, that is attributable to such shifting. In case of the two other dependent variables, we pre-
sumably directly observe profit shifting (to targets in low-tax countries).  
We contribute to research in two ways: First, we contribute to previous literature through the 
consideration of different dependent variables in one sample, which helps to show the whole 
picture of profit shifting within one sample. Since we assume profit shifting opportunities for 
high-tax targets which enter a non-CFC rule MNE, real investment in those firms should in-
crease. Correspondingly, tax rates should affect whether profits are shifted to other targets, 
which we investigate in the regressions with financial revenues and EBT per PPE as dependent 
variables. If we are able to confirm those two effects, we can be more certain that generally 
profit shifting is indeed conducted after such acquisitions. Second, by generally analyzing the 
effect of the presence or non-presence of CFC rules at the MNEs’ headquarters’ level on target 
investment following a cross-border acquisition, we contribute to the understanding of tax ef-
fects on this specific FDI form. 
Based on this previous literature and the focus of the paper, we will now formulate hypotheses 
in the following subsections. We differentiate between two cases: First, we consider targets of 
non-CFC rule MNEs. Second, we consider targets of CFC rule MNEs.  
2.2.1. Case 1: Target enters a non-CFC rule MNE 
As mentioned above, in one of our two settings, we consider the case where a formerly domestic 
target is acquired by a non-CFC rule MNE. This has the effect that the target can generally 
engage in group-wide profit shifting lowering its cost of capital. Consequently, its lower cost 
of capital should positively influence real investment.5 We expect the increase in real invest-
ment to be more pronounced with an increasing statutory corporate tax rate of the target. The 
reasoning is as follows: If the target resides in a low-tax country, its cost of capital is already 
quite low, i.e., more real investment projects have already been conducted in the pre-acquisition 
period compared to a high-tax target with relatively high cost of capital. We, therefore, hypoth-
esize the following, stated in alternative form: 
                                                 
5 One limitation is that sellers may be aware of this advantage of the buyers and hence demand higher acquisition 
prices. This additional spending might reduce the funding for investment and hence counteract the effect. But we 
still expect investment effects since, particularly due to limited information, it is unlikely that the sellers may set 
the prices in a way to fully account for those advantages of the buyers. Further, the influence of the sellers on the 
acquisition price depends on their bargaining power. 
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H1: With an increasing statutory corporate tax rate of a formerly domestic target, real invest-
ment of the target increases following an acquisition by an MNE with no CFC rules in its head-
quarters’ residence country. 
Referring to the profit shifting strategies outlined in Section 2.1, we expect that financial reve-
nues of a formerly domestic target in a low-tax country will increase once this target enters an 
MNE, which can generally engage in group-wide profit shifting. The idea is that financial rev-
enues are shifted from high-tax affiliates to the low-tax target. We, therefore, hypothesize the 
following, stated in alternative form: 
H2: With a decreasing statutory corporate tax rate of a formerly domestic target, financial rev-
enues of the target increase following an acquisition by an MNE with no CFC rules in its head-
quarters’ residence country. 
As mentioned above, another measure of profit shifting is EBT per PPE. Here the effect may 
be driven by high-tax as well as low-tax targets: For high-tax targets, due to increasing invest-
ment if profit shifting occurs, the denominator is expected to increase while the numerator is 
supposed to decrease due to reduced profits (see Hypothesis 1). In low tax targets, which be-
come destinations of profit shifting, this measure should increase (see Hypothesis 2). Hence 
EBT per PPE should generally decline with the tax rate and we conclude our next hypothesis, 
stated in alternative form: 
H3: With an increasing statutory corporate tax rate of a formerly domestic target, EBT per PPE 
of the target decreases following an acquisition by an MNE with no CFC rules in its headquar-
ters’ residence country. 
2.2.2. Case 2: Target enters a CFC rule MNE 
In case a formerly domestic target is acquired by a CFC rule MNE, the target enters an MNE, 
which cannot engage in group-wide profit shifting. We do not expect to observe the above 
described positive effect of acquisitions on high-tax target real investment as the target’s cost 
of capital remains unchanged due to the lack of profit shifting opportunities in this case. We, 
therefore, hypothesize the following: 
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H4a: Real investment of a formerly domestic target does not increase with the statutory corpo-
rate tax rate following an acquisition by an MNE with CFC rules in its headquarters’ residence 
country. 
Moreover, as the profit shifting strategies outlined in Section 2.1 are not achievable within such 
an MNE, real investment profit shifting may be used to circumvent these limitations. In partic-
ular, if the MNE’s CFC rules include only passive income (as denoted above this includes fi-
nancial portfolio investment as well as loans to affiliated firms), the MNE might be eager to 
conduct real investment in low-tax targets because the generated active income resulting from 
this investment is taxed at low statutory corporate tax rates. This is reflected by the following 
hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
H4b: With a decreasing statutory corporate tax rate of a formerly domestic target, real invest-
ment of the target increases following an acquisition by an MNE with CFC rules that only 
include passive income. 
Finally, we again consider two measures of profit shifting: financial revenues and EBT per PPE. 
We expect that the effect of the target statutory corporate tax rate on those measures of a for-
merly domestic target does not change, when it enters an MNE, which cannot engage in group-
wide profit shifting. That is due to the lack of opportunities to shift profits into low-tax targets 
or out of high-tax targets within the MNE. Hence, we state our fifth hypothesis: 
H5: Financial revenues of a formerly domestic target do not decrease with the statutory corpo-
rate tax rate following an acquisition by an MNE with CFC rules in its headquarters’ residence 
country. 
Accordingly, we also expect no effect of the tax rate on EBT per PPE: 
H6: EBT per PPE of a formerly domestic target does not decrease with the statutory corporate 
tax rate following an acquisition by an MNE with CFC rules in its headquarters’ residence 
country. 
There are also other regulations targeted against profit shifting, such as thin capitalization or 
earnings stripping rules and transfer pricing documentation rules. Because of those rules, even 
in the absence of CFC rules profit shifting may not be possible. Therefore, we account for those 
rules in the extensions part.  
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3. Data 
We investigate the above-mentioned hypotheses with an empirical analysis. Our data is taken 
from the Zephyr database (Bureau van Dijk), which contains worldwide acquisition transac-
tions and provides information on the countries of the direct acquirer and target as well as ac-
quired shares of the target. We select all completed acquisitions through which more than 100% 
of the target shares were acquired (ensuring that the MNE has enough influence on the firm to 
conduct profit shifting) and which took place in the period 2008 to 2013 (2008 to 2012 in case 
of EBT per PPE). Before 2008 we do not have information on GUOs, so we cannot investigate 
the effects of CFC rules.  
To answer our research question on the effect of CFC rules on target investment following 
acquisitions, we have to merge target financial data, which are not provided in the Zephyr da-
tabase. Therefore, we merge PPE, financial revenues and EBT from the Amadeus database 
(Bureau van Dijk) using Bureau van Dijk identification numbers that link Zephyr with 
Amadeus. For our regression analysis, we require at least one observation before and after the 
acquisition per target firm. We do not consider the acquisition year since the exact acquisition 
dates vary within the acquisition years between the acquisitions. Further, we exclude targets 
from the financial services sector due to special regulations on their balance sheet structure, 
which may bias our results. In addition, we consider only targets with unconsolidated financial 
data since we are interested in the investment effects only at the target-level. Finally, we exclude 
targets that have an accumulated loss over our considered period. Further, we exclude observa-
tions which have an extraordinarily small or large EBT per PPE, i.e., we drop observations with 
an EBT per PPE within the 1%-percentile or above the 99%-percentile. Information on those 
target financial data – which we consider before and after the acquisitions – are given for the 
years 2004 to 2014 (for 2004 to 2013 in case of EBT per PPE). 
Further, we need to ensure that the target was a domestic one before the acquisition and be-
comes part of an MNE through the acquisition. To address this data set requirement, we use 
ownership data of the target and direct acquirer provided by Amadeus in the following way: 
For the target, we merge its global ultimate owner (GUO) before the acquisition. We keep the 
acquisition in our data set if the target GUO has only domestic subsidiaries. If the target is the 
GUO itself or a stand-alone firm, we follow the same logic. Also for the direct acquirer, we 
merge its GUO before the acquisition. We keep the acquisition in our data set if the acquirer 
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GUO is from another country than the target or has non-domestic subsidiaries (besides possible 
domestic subsidiaries). This is necessary so that the GUO or affiliates are in other countries. 
Only then, profits may be shifted. If the direct acquirer is the GUO itself, we follow the same 
logic. 
To investigate the effect of acquirer GUO CFC rules on target investment following acquisi-
tions, we collect data on whether the acquirer GUO’s residence country applies CFC rules or 
not and – in case of binding CFC rules – whether only passive or passive and active income is 
taxed in the acquirer GUO’s residence country. We split our final sample into two parts for our 
regression analysis (see Section 4). In the first part, we analyze target investment, financial 
revenues and profits following the acquisition if the acquirer GUO resides in a non-CFC rule 
country (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3). In the second part, we analyze those measures if the acquirer 
GUO resides in a CFC rule country (Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 5 and 6).6 
Due to quite demanding data set requirements – financial and/or GUO data are often missing –
our final sample consists of 1,505 observations (213 acquisitions) in case of PPE as the depend-
ent variable. For financial revenues respectively EBT per PPE the sample reduces to 731 re-
spectively 515 observations. In about two thirds of the cases, the acquirer GUO comes from a 
CFC rule country. The number of observations before and after an acquisition varies across 
firms. Though for a considerable number of firms (at least 50) we have observations for 6 years 
before and 4 years after an acquisition (5 years before and 3 years after for financial revenues 
and 3 years before and 2 years after for EBT per PPE).   
Table 1 shows the origins of the acquirer GUOs and targets in our sample and information on 
CFC rules and tax rates. For each country, the number of GUOs and targets, which appear in 
our sample and are located in the respective country, are listed. Australia, e.g., is the host coun-
try of 10 GUOs but no firms in Australia have been acquired. Note that, besides for very few 
exceptions, we do not observe targets outside Europe. Zephyr is global in coverage, whereas 
Amadeus, besides the exceptions, only contains financial data for European firms. In line with 
di Giovanni (2005), we observe that countries with the largest financial markets (USA and 
United Kingdom) have most acquirer GUOs in our acquisition sample. For all those countries, 
                                                 
6 Note that, in our sample, CFC rules either do exist or do not exist for each acquirer’s headquarters’ country 
throughout the whole considered period. We therefore exclude acquisitions with an acquirer GUO from China as 
China introduced CFC rules in 2008 and, hence, cannot be grouped into the CFC or non-CFC rule country sample 
in our period. 
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where we observe targets, it is reasonable to expect real investment effects as outlined in Sec-
tion 2.2 because those countries are presumably sufficiently large economies to perform real 
activity. This also includes the low-tax countries (identified here as countries with a tax rate 
smaller than the median of 28%), which are Ireland, the United Kingdom and several Eastern 
European countries.7  
Table 1 shows also that almost all developed countries (if, e.g., OECD membership is consid-
ered as a criterion for development) have CFC rules. Certain countries are exemptions, i.e., 
developed countries without CFC rules, namely Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland. The USA have CFC rules, but, as mentioned before, those 
have de facto become ineffective through the so-called check-the-box regulation, so we do not 
consider the USA as a country with CFC rules. Since those countries (at least de facto) have no 
CFC rules, we can be confident, that it is not the difference between developed and other coun-
tries that actually determines the effect which we assign to CFC rules. As mentioned above, the 
Cadbury-Schweppes ruling triggered a mitigation of the application of CFC rules within the 
European Economic Area (EEA). The rules may even be considered to be ineffective since the 
requirements for their non-applicability have become relatively low. However, the minimum 
achievable tax rate is only the lowest one within the EEA. Hence, shifting profits to a country 
with a smaller tax rate is still not possible and the EEA-countries are considered as CFC-rule 
countries also after the ruling. If we would still see an increase of real investment in high-tax 
countries for targets of CFC-rule MNEs, we could adapt this classification of EEA countries. 
However, our results (as described in Section 5) show that this is not the case.  
  
                                                 
7 Note that given the different availability of observations and tax rate changes over time the differentiation be-
tween high and low-tax countries may differ for the different dependent variables. However, this is never the case. 
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Table 1: Origins of acquirer GUO and target firms.   
Country Number of deals 
with acquirer GUO 
residing in the coun-
try 
Number of tar-
gets 
Existence of CFC 
rules in acquirer 
GUO country 
(yes/no) 
50%-percentile 
of tax rate 
(yes/no) 
Australia 10 0 1 0 
Austria 1 4 0 N/A 
Belgium 3 9 0 0 
Bermuda 4 0 0 N/A 
Canada 4 0 1 N/A 
Cayman Islands 1 0 0 N/A 
Croatia 0 1 N/A 1 
Czech Republic 1 6 0 N/A 
Denmark 1 1 1 N/A 
Estonia 1 4 1 1 
Finland 6 9 1 N/A 
France 6 17 1 0 
Germany 13 26 1 0 
Greece 0 2 N/A N/A 
Hungary 0 1 N/A 1 
India 6 0 0 N/A 
Ireland 4 2 0 1 
Israel 5 0 1 N/A 
Italy 5 10 1 0 
Japan 2 0 1 N/A 
Latvia 0 2 N/A 1 
Lithuania 3 1 1 1 
Malaysia 1 0 0 N/A 
Malta 1 0 0 N/A 
Netherlands 9 10 0 N/A 
New Zealand 1 0 1 N/A 
Norway 4 7 1 N/A 
Panama 1 0 0 N/A 
Poland 2 3 0 1 
Portugal 1 2 1 N/A 
Romania 0 2 N/A 1 
Russian Federa-
tion 
4 6 0 1 
Slovak Republic 0 1 N/A 1 
Spain 7 5 1 0 
Sweden 11 2 1 N/A 
Switzerland 2 0 0 N/A 
Taiwan, China 1 0 0 N/A 
Ukraine 0 1 N/A 1 
United Kingdom 42 79 1 1 
USA 50 0 0 0 
Total 213 213    
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4. Empirical approach 
We analyze investment in targets after acquisitions using the following panel regression: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,         (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the dependent variable that measures either the natural logarithm of PPE 
(lnTarPPE), the natural logarithm of financial revenues (lnTarFinRevenue) or EBT per PPE 
(TarEBTperPPE) for target i in year t. 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 takes the value one for years following 
the acquisition and 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 measures the target’s statutory corporate tax rate.8 
𝛽𝛽1 measures the effect of synergy gains achieved through the acquisition at target level. We 
have no expectation on the sign of the coefficient of 𝛽𝛽1 because a priori the effect of synergy 
gains is ambiguous. On the one hand, the acquisition may lead to an increase in target invest-
ment, e.g., because the target avails of a certain technology, which is new for the MNE and is 
expanded at target level (or the MNE avails of such a technology which can now be used also 
within the target). On the other hand, the acquisition may lead to target divestment, e.g., because 
some target functions are already performed elsewhere within the MNE, i.e., rationalization 
takes place at target-level.9 Financial revenues are not expected to be affected by such synergy 
gains, because those gains presumably rather affect real production or services in general. Prof-
its may increase (if the MNE avails of a better technology or target functions are shifted to 
affiliates while output stays constant), decrease (if new functions are shifted from affiliates to 
the target while output stays constant) or stay constant (if none of this happens). 
𝛽𝛽2 measures the general effect of the target’s statutory corporate tax rate on the dependent var-
iables. We expect a negative coefficient for 𝛽𝛽2 for all dependent variables. In case of PPE, the 
tax rate has a positive effect on the cost of capital and, consequently, fewer investments are 
undertaken. Note that the assumption on the tax rate only holds before the acquisition when the 
target is a domestic firm. Regarding the other dependent variables, they should be negatively 
                                                 
8 One limitation is that whenever we consider financial revenues, we presumably only observe profit shifting via 
debt. Income from IP would rather fall under operational income since in many cases licensing of such IP is 
probably the main operation of the respective firm. 
9 For a similar argumentation of the effects of acquisitions on target employment and output, see Conyon et al. 
(2002) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004). 
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affected by the tax rate because firms are expected to locate financial revenues and profits in 
low-tax countries.  
After the acquisition, i.e., if 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1, we have to distinguish whether the MNEs’ 
headquarters reside in a country with CFC rules or not. This is carried out by running separate 
regressions (sample split) for the two cases. 
𝛽𝛽3 measures the post-acquisition effect of the target’s statutory corporate tax rate on investment. 
We expect a positive sign of this coefficient in the regression with PPE as the dependent varia-
ble in case a target is acquired by a non-CFC rule MNE. This effect is due to profit shifting 
opportunities, which may decrease the cost of capital after the acquisition of high-tax targets in 
particular (Hypothesis 1). Low-tax targets may, however, become destinations of profit shifting 
themselves. In line with this reasoning, we expect a negative sign for 𝛽𝛽3 in the regressions with 
financial revenues and EBT per PPE as dependent variables (Hypotheses 2 and 3). Furthermore, 
the effect for EBT should not just be a consequence of this profit shifting opportunities to low-
tax targets, but – as mentioned in Hypothesis 1 – also follow from the shifting of profits out of 
high-tax targets.  
If a target is acquired by a CFC rule MNE, we generally expect no effect on PPE after the 
acquisition since the typical profit shifting strategies outlined in Section 2.1 are ineffective. 
Accordingly, 𝛽𝛽3 is expected to be zero for these dependent variables (Hypothesis 4a). In case 
the CFC rule only includes passive income, we expect a negative sign for 𝛽𝛽3 in the regression 
with PPE as dependent variable since we assume higher real investment in low-tax countries 
after the acquisition. We argue that decreasing the MNE’s tax burden may only be achieved via 
real investment profit shifting (Hypothesis 4b). For financial revenues and EBT per PPE, 𝛽𝛽3 is 
again expected to be zero (Hypotheses 5 and 6). 
It is important for understanding our estimation setting, that for PPE it is irrelevant whether the 
target falls under CFC rules because we consider profit shifting opportunities to affiliates. We 
do not account for whether the CFC rules actually apply to the affiliates, since it is difficult to 
observe the full group structure in the data set. However, since – as we will see later – we find 
that the suspected profit shifting effect can no longer be observed in case of CFC rules, we can 
assume that they are binding for the affiliates of at least some MNEs. For financial revenues 
and EBT per PPE, which are assumed to increase if the targets become destinations for profit 
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shifting opportunities, it is however relevant, whether the CFC rules apply. If we would observe 
potential profit shifting for CFC rule MNEs, we maybe should try to exclude those targets where 
the CFC rules actually do not apply. For the remaining ones, i.e., those were the rules apply, 
we definitely should see no effect. However, since we presumably do not observe profit shifting 
for CFC rule MNEs, we abstain from this extended analysis in this paper. Further, one may also 
argue, that it is relevant to consider also CFC rules of intermediate subsidiaries in third coun-
tries. However, we assume that if there are CFC rules in such subsidiaries, there should also be 
CFC rules in the headquarters’ country, since it is not likely that MNEs worsen their profit 
shifting opportunities by interposing an intermediate subsidiary with CFC rules if there are no 
such rules in the headquarters’ country. 
In addition to our variables of interest, we include a vector of target firm and country control 
variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. Whereas some control variables are used only for some of the dependent varia-
bles, others are used for all. Our selection of control variables is largely oriented on previous 
literature measuring effects of taxes on investment (e.g., Overesch (2009), Ruf and Weichen-
rieder (2012)) and profits (Weichenrieder (2009)). At the target-level, we control for losses in 
the previous period that could have a negative effect on investment decisions and profits in the 
following period. In case of PPE and EBT per PPE as dependent variables, we also control for 
the target’s non-PPE assets, i.e., all balance sheet items other than PPE. We expect a positive 
effect of non-PPE assets because an increase in other assets, such as liquid assets may have a 
positive effect on investment in PPE. This may lead to more economic activity in the target 
which should also increase EBT (in large firms, economies of scale may lead to a higher prof-
itability). On the contrary, for financial revenues, we use PPE as another explanatory variable. 
For this variable, we expect a positive effect because financial revenues are obtained from liquid 
assets (bonds and financial portfolio investment), which larger firms presumably tend to hold 
in higher quantities (Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012)). At the country level, we control for mac-
roeconomic conditions, including GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth and a corruption index. 
In the regressions with financial revenues as the dependent variable, we also control for infla-
tion as a measure for local lending conditions. If the lending conditions in the country are rela-
tively good (i.e., the inflation is high), debt may be taken there and forwarded via internal lend-
ing to affiliates with adverse local lending conditions. This should increase the financial reve-
nues of the subsidiary. 
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Further, we include target firm fixed effects 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and year fixed effects 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡. Firm fixed effects 
control for unobserved target-specific factors that could have effects on the dependent variables, 
i.e., target-specific heterogeneity materializing in changes of the dependent variable. Year fixed 
effects control for unobserved time trends, such as business cycles, which may influence the de-
pendent variable. 𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the residual. Table 2 provides variable definitions, 
data sources and summary statistics of all variables.  
It is possible that the observed targets within the different countries are not independently and 
identically distributed and so the standard errors are clustered. This could lead to biased stand-
ard errors, especially since our variable of interest (𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) is a variable at the country level 
(Cameron and Trivedi (2009)). To account for this issue, we use cluster-robust standard errors 
on the target country level.10 However, as mentioned in the previous section, our data set is 
restricted to only 26 target countries (21 countries in case of financial revenues and 23 countries 
in case of EBT per PPE). Since with few clusters (five to thirty) cluster-robust standard errors 
are downward biased and the H0-Hypothesis of no effect is rejected too often, bootstrapping 
has to be applied (Cameron et al. (2008)). We follow Greene (2012) and apply 1,000 bootstrap 
replications.11 
There are two major limitations to our identification strategy: First, we are careful in stating the 
exact mechanism behind the discussed effects. It could be that already the acquisition decision 
is determined by CFC rules. Regarding PPE for example, out of the group of MNEs, which 
want to invest, it may only be the ones with no CFC rules, which acquire targets in high-tax 
countries to invest there because only they can do profit shifting and hence conduct investment 
which is profitable after taxes. So we can think of two possible channels. Either targets are 
acquired independently of CFC rules and then CFC rules affect investment and profit shifting 
or CFC rules already affect the acquisition decision. In any of the two cases, we however end 
up with our hypotheses. Further analyses could apply an instrumental variable approach to iden-
tify other drivers of acquisitions, which would allow to precisely measure the first channel. 
However, it is difficult to find instruments, which are independent of CFC rules. One instrument 
may be cash holdings of the acquirer. However, those cash holdings may also depend on CFC 
rules, since firms with no CFC rules have the possibility to accumulate substantial amounts of 
                                                 
10 For more details on cluster-robust standard errors, see Cameron and Miller (2015). 
11 For more details on bootstrapping, see Cameron et al. (2008). Our robustness analysis shows that applying robust 
standard errors does not change the level of statistical significance of our coefficients.  
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cash in tax havens. Further, the limited number of observations makes any instrumental variable 
approach difficult. Second, as research has found out, the presence of CFC rules in an MNE’s 
headquarters’ country increases the probability that the headquarters are relocated to a non-
CFC rule country (Voget (2011)). Hence, several of the MNEs, which still have their headquar-
ters in a country with CFC rules, might be less tax aggressive and, therefore, may not engage 
in profit shifting. Therefore, it would actually not be the CFC rules but the tax aggressiveness 
that affects investment. Here, further research could exploit short run effects of abrupt changes 
of CFC rules (like in Holzmann (2014)), which may be exogenous.
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Table 2: Definition, data sources and summary statistics of variables. 
Variable Definition Data source Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
TarPPE PPE of target (in millions of USD) Amadeus 1,505 11.101 56.772 0.000 1,204.804 
TarFinRevenue Financial revenues of target (in millions of USD) Amadeus 731 1.883 25.447 0.000 661.043 
TarEBT_perPPE EBT divided by PPE of target Amadeus 515 4.098 13.349 -15.179 160.676 
postMAyear 1 if year is after acquisition Zephyr 1,505 0.345 0.475 0.000 1.000 
TarSTR Statutory corporate tax rate in target country  Tax Guides 1,505 0.286 0.052 0.125 0.389 
AcqGUO_CFC 1 if CFC rules exist in acquirer GUO country Tax Guides 1,505 0.587 0.493 0.000 1.000 
TarAssets_noPPE Assets other than PPE of target (in millions of USD) Amadeus 1,505 41.670 267.231 0.003 6,444.162 
TarLoss_lag 1 if target has a loss in previous year Amadeus 1,505 0.079 0.270 0.000 1.000 
TarEmployees Employees of target  Amadeus 515 122.930 148.039 2.000 947.000 
TarTurnover Turnover of target (in millions of USD) Amadeus 515 140.682 1,028.305 0.123 16,400.250 
TarGDP GDP in target country (in trillions of USD) World Bank 1,505 1.857 1.132 0.012 3.868 
TarGDP_growth GDP growth in target country (in %) World Bank 1,505 1.473 3.053 -14.800 12.100 
TarGDP_percapita GDP per capita in target country (in thousands of 
USD) 
World Bank 1,505 39.268 14.240 1.367 102.910 
TarCorruption Corruption index in target country World Bank 1,505 1.422 0.733 -1.088 2.553 
TarInflation Inflation in target country (in %) World Bank 1,505 2.732 3.135 -9.686 28.583 
Data on year fixed effects are not reported but are available upon request. Most summary statistics are based on the regression with lnTarPPE as the dependent variable 
and CFC rule as well as non-CFC rule MNEs included (Specification 1 in Table 3). Exceptions are the summary statistics for the other dependent variables and for 
employees and turnover (employees and turnover are only used in the regressions with EBT per PPE as dependent variable) which are based on the respective regres-
sions for the other dependent variables. 
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5. Results and robustness analysis 
5.1. Property, plant and equipment 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. As discussed in Section 2, we 
expect different effects of acquisitions on real investment (PPE) in the targets depending on 
whether there are CFC rules or not in the acquirer’s headquarters’ country. We start our analysis 
with two graphs illustrating the development of low-tax and high-tax targets’ PPE in Figure 1.  
Development of target PPE before and after acquisition 
  
Figure 1. This figure illustrates the development of target PPE (median value) over 10 years. Normalized year 
0 is the acquisition year, which is excluded (see Section 3). PPE is on the y-axis and normalized years are on 
the x-axis. The observations are 1,412 (2,400) for low-tax (high-tax) targets. Low-tax targets (high-tax targets) 
are defined as targets with a statutory corporate tax rate that is smaller (equal or higher) than the median target 
statutory corporate tax rate in each year, i.e., the considered targets are classified as either low-tax or high-tax 
targets. In addition, for each data point in the graphs, we require at least 20 observations for the median value 
calculation. Data source: see Section 3. 
 
In line with Hypothesis 1, PPE of high-tax targets acquired by non-CFC rule MNEs increases 
after the acquisition. We trace this finding back to the decline in cost of capital of formerly 
domestic high-tax targets due to profit shifting opportunities once they enter a non-CFC rule 
MNE. This may lead to the realization of more investment projects (see Section 2.2.1). PPE of 
high-tax targets acquired by CFC rule MNEs does not seem to be much affected by the acqui-
sition.12 In low-tax targets, we see an increase of investment for targets acquired by CFC rule 
                                                 
12 Since PPE for non-CFC rule MNEs is already slightly higher in years before the acquisition, we will test in the 
extensions part (Section 5.4), whether there is a common trend before the acquisition for PPE and the other de-
pendent variables for those targets which are acquired by a CFC rule respectively non-CFC rule MNEs (though 
only the results for non-CFC rule MNEs – which are of most interest to us – are shown). We test whether the 
observed post-acquisition effects may actually have started already several years before or after the acquisition by 
variants of the regressions. We find, inter alia, an increase of PPE already in the year before the acquisition. We 
will explain that this is however presumably not problematic for our results. 
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MNEs in the third year after the acquisition, which supports our assumption of profit shifting 
via real investment (Hypothesis 4b).  
Table 3 shows the results for the regressions with PPE as the dependent variable. Specification 
1 includes our full sample of target firms, whereas the following two distinguish between targets 
acquired by non-CFC rule MNEs (Specification 2) or CFC rule MNEs (Specification 3). Dif-
ferent from the graphs, we now consider the tax rate as a continuous variable. Specification 4 
shows the results for CFC rules that only include passive income. 
Table 3: Effect of acquisitions on target PPE. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables All MNEs non-CFC rule 
MNEs 
CFC rule 
MNEs 
CFC rule 
MNEs (only 
passive income 
included) 
     
postMAyear -0.508 -1.104* 0.037 0.559 
 (0.398) (0.567) (0.738) (1.244) 
TarSTR -1.223 -3.846 1.821 0.032 
 (1.594) (3.042) (2.957) (4.316) 
postMAyear#TarSTR 1.402 3.569* -0.691 -0.989 
 (1.287) (1.966) (2.526) (4.110) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 0.499*** 0.421*** 0.557*** 0.388* 
 (0.086) (0.117) (0.100) (0.199) 
TarLoss_lag -0.071 0.066 -0.127 -0.027 
 (0.083) (0.134) (0.129) (0.154) 
lnTarGDP 7.035*** 7.858 8.577** 4.356 
 (2.598) (5.462) (4.322) (7.113) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -5.881** -6.413 -7.576* -3.809 
 (2.460) (5.197) (4.041) (6.640) 
TarGDP_growth -0.027** -0.020 -0.032 -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.021) (0.045) 
TarCorruption 0.089 -0.326 0.479 0.613 
 (0.317) (0.533) (0.479) (0.620) 
Constant -128.410*** -144.715 -154.725** -76.313 
 (45.446) (97.381) (76.452) (127.448) 
     
Observations 1,505 622 883 331 
Deals 213 91 122 66 
R-squared 0.214 0.199 0.242 0.201 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regressions with target PPE (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see equation (1). For variable descriptions 
and data sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are 
estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
 
In our results, the general effect of an acquisition (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) is negative and statistically 
significant in case of no CFC rules in the acquirer’s headquarters’ country (Specification 2). As 
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outlined in Section 4, the acquisition effect could be either positive or negative. Here we ob-
serve significant divestment in PPE after the acquisition, which may indicate that rationalization 
takes place at target level. We do not find this effect for the other specifications. Further, we 
find that 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 has no significant effect on real investment. It may be, that, given that there 
is relatively little variation over time, the effect of this variable is absorbed by the firm fixed 
effects. 
Our variable of interest, the interaction term, is significantly positive in the second specifica-
tion. Therefore, once a target is acquired by a non-CFC rule MNE, investment increases after 
the acquisition with an increasing tax rate. This is evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. To 
quantify the effect of the acquisition on PPE, we compare this effect for the lowest and highest 
target statutory corporate tax rates in our sample (12.5% respectively 38.9%).13 For low-tax 
targets, we calculate the acquisition effect on PPE to be -0.658 (-1.104+3.569*0.125). Given 
that our dependent variable is given as the natural logarithm, this translates into a decrease of 
48% (=e(-0.658)-1) in PPE after acquisitions. For high-tax targets, we calculate the effect to be 
0.284 (-1.104+3.569*0.389). In this case, the estimated effect is an increase of 33% (=e(0.284)-
1) in PPE after acquisitions. The F-Test for joint significance of 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 and its interac-
tion with 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 holds (p-value of 0.072). As outlined in Section 2.2.1, the effect is supposed 
to be observed because profit shifting reduces the target’s cost of capital to a higher degree in 
high-tax target countries compared to low-tax target countries. Therefore, relatively more in-
vestment is carried out in high-tax target countries.14 
The aforementioned effect should not be observed if the target is acquired by a CFC rule MNE. 
Indeed, the interaction term is insignificant in Specification 3, which supports Hypothesis 4a. 
We would expect a negative effect of the interaction term in Specification 4, where we consider 
only CFC rules that include passive income, i.e., active income from real investment activity is 
excluded when applying CFC rules. In this case, we assume that those MNEs shift profits via 
real investment to low-tax targets (Hypothesis 4b). We find that the coefficient for the interac-
tion term is insignificant. Hence, we do not find support for this hypothesis. However, note that 
                                                 
13 Referring to Equation 1, we measure this effect by calculating the derivation 𝛿𝛿𝑌𝑌 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝⁄ . 
14 However, our results indicate that acquisitions have an overall negative effect on real investment in targets with 
a relatively low tax rate. As outlined in Section 4, this may be due to rationalization at target-level, e.g., because 
some business functions may already be performed elsewhere within the MNE at lower cost. 
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– as a caveat – our sample for this case includes only a relatively small number of 66 deals with 
331 observations in total.  
Regarding control variables, we find a significantly positive effect for non-PPE assets in all 
specifications. This is as expected, because, as discussed in Section 4, other assets, such as 
liquid assets, may allow for more investment in PPE. The positive and significant effect of GDP 
but opposing effects for GDP per capita and GDP growth (at least in some specifications) may 
be a slight indication, that within our sample the size of the economy (GDP) but not its growth 
or wealth (GDP per capita) is favorable for higher investment.   
5.2. Financial revenues 
Whereas the results in the previous section have shown that PPE increases in high-tax targets 
due to profit shifting opportunities, financial revenues are expected to increase in low-tax tar-
gets after the acquisition by non-CFC rule MNEs. This would be caused by profit shifting op-
portunities from high-tax affiliates within the MNE to those low-tax targets (Hypothesis 2). 
Similar to the graphical analysis in Section 5.1, we illustrate the development of financial rev-
enues in Figure 2.  
Development of target financial revenues before and after acquisition 
  
Figure 2. This figure illustrates the development of target financial revenues (median value) over 9 years. 
Normalized year 0 is the acquisition year, which is excluded (see Section 3). Financial revenues are on the y-
axis and normalized years are on the x-axis. The observations are 639 (1,585) for low-tax (high-tax) targets. 
Low-tax targets (high-tax targets) are defined as targets with a statutory corporate tax rate that is smaller (equal 
or higher) than the median target statutory corporate tax rate in each year, i.e., the considered targets are 
classified as either low-tax or high-tax targets. In addition, for each data point in the graphs, we require at least 
20 observations for the median value calculation. Data source: see Section 3. 
 
The graph on the left side surprisingly shows that financial revenues of low-tax targets acquired 
by CFC rule MNEs increase after the acquisition. We would expect this effect rather for non-
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CFC rule MNEs (see Hypothesis 2). However, this effect reverts in the third year after the 
acquisition. In addition, we do not find a clear pattern for the development of financial revenues 
in high-tax targets.  
In line with our discussion from Section 2.2.1, Specification 1 in Table 4 shows that target 
financial revenues increase after the acquisition with a decreasing target statutory corporate tax 
rate. 
Table 4: Effect of acquisitions on target financial revenues. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables All MNEs non-CFC rule 
MNEs 
CFC rule MNEs 
    
postMAyear 1.559 2.121 0.739 
 (1.132) (1.634) (1.371) 
TarSTR 3.484 9.562 1.642 
 (5.207) (10.458) (6.054) 
postMAyear#TarSTR -7.052* -8.990 -4.672 
 (4.197) (6.272) (4.809) 
lnTarPPE 0.250** 0.035 0.349*** 
 (0.098) (0.200) (0.131) 
TarLoss_lag -0.230 -0.609 0.005 
 (0.263) (0.615) (0.239) 
lnTarGDP -6.503 -13.545 -5.271 
 (7.680) (15.851) (8.870) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 5.063 10.930 4.640 
 (7.826) (15.968) (9.362) 
TarGDP_growth 0.040 0.097 -0.027 
 (0.045) (0.077) (0.072) 
TarCorruption 0.501 -0.020 1.117 
 (1.177) (1.690) (1.396) 
TarInflation 0.042 0.001 0.043 
 (0.070) (0.102) (0.076) 
Constant 133.871 273.623 101.705 
 (136.367) (277.409) (152.673) 
    
Observations 731 314 417 
Deals 114 50 64 
R-squared 0.0746 0.0872 0.114 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Regressions with target financial revenues (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see equation (1). For vari-
able descriptions and data sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed 
effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
 
We assume that this is the case, since low-tax targets become destinations of shifted profits. We 
expect this effect only for targets which are acquired by non-CFC rule MNEs. It may be possible 
that this effect also dominates in the overall sample. However, if we consider those MNEs in 
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particular (Specification 2) the effect can no longer be observed, so we cannot confirm Hypoth-
esis 2. In line with Hypothesis 5, we observe in Specification 3 that financial revenues are in-
sensitive to the statutory corporate tax rate of a formerly domestic target following an acquisi-
tion by a CFC rule MNE. However, given that we found no effect in case of no CFC rules, this 
is of limited interest, too.  
Regarding the other variables, as discussed above, we have no clear expectation about the co-
efficient for 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, but again expect a negative effect of the tax rate. However, we find 
no significant effect here. Regarding firm size (measured by PPE), – at least in the overall sam-
ple and for CFC-rule MNEs – financial revenues seem to increase with this variable, which, as 
discussed above, may be explained by a tendency of larger firms to hold higher quantities of 
liquid assets. The other control variables are insignificant. Presumably, as discussed for the tax 
rate in Section 5.1, their effects are absorbed by the firm fixed effects. 
5.3. EBT per PPE 
In addition to financial revenues, which we considered in the previous subsection, we now in-
vestigate the effect of taxes, profit shifting opportunities and CFC rules on another measure of 
profit shifting, namely EBT per PPE. Again, we start our empirical analysis with descriptive 
statistics on the evolvement of this variable after the acquisition (Figure 3).  
Development of EBT per PPE before and after acquisition 
  
Figure 3. This figure illustrates the development of EBT per PPE (median value) over 9 years. Normalized year 
0 is the acquisition year, which is excluded (see Section 3). EBT per PPE is on the y-axis and normalized years 
are on the x-axis. The observations are 1,328 (2,011) for low-tax (high-tax) targets. Low-tax targets (high-tax 
targets) are defined as targets with a statutory corporate tax rate that is smaller (equal or higher) than the median 
target statutory corporate tax rate in each year, i.e., the considered targets are classified as either low-tax or 
high-tax targets. In addition, for each data point in the graphs, we require at least 20 observations for the median 
value calculation. Data source: see Section 3. 
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Both, for low-tax targets as well as for high-tax targets we see a decrease of this measure after 
acquisitions. Whereas the picture for low-tax targets – where the profits more or less return to 
the level before the acquisitions over time – is not clear; in high-tax targets there is a strong 
decline after acquisitions. The latter may indicate that – in line with our findings for PPE – 
profits are shifted away from high-tax targets, once they enter an MNE. However, surprisingly, 
this development can be found for both, CFC-rule and non CFC-rule MNEs.  
Regarding the regression results, as for financial revenues, we do not find a significant effect 
for the interaction in Specification 2 (see Table 5).  
Table 5: Effect of acquisitions on target EBT per PPE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables All MNEs non-CFC rule 
MNEs 
CFC rule MNEs 
    
postMAyear 4.096 -1.549 8.063 
 (6.139) (8.848) (10.691) 
TarSTR 42.768 78.384 38.528 
 (35.253) (68.075) (81.736) 
postMAyear#TarSTR -11.991 12.851 -29.979 
 (20.085) (32.898) (33.951) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 1.459 1.853* 1.609 
 (1.370) (1.048) (1.943) 
lnTarEmployees -1.862 -2.483 -1.885 
 (2.276) (2.286) (5.092) 
lnTarTurnover 1.711 3.095* 0.583 
 (1.451) (1.764) (3.058) 
TarLoss_lag -1.083 -0.081 -1.054 
 (1.188) (2.846) (2.763) 
lnTarGDP 44.133 -14.391 85.162 
 (41.360) (63.888) (71.585) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -33.041 22.130 -72.377 
 (35.347) (61.512) (62.532) 
TarGDP_growth 0.366 0.332 0.460 
 (0.231) (0.234) (0.452) 
TarCorruption -13.634 -22.594 -7.432 
 (9.384) (20.938) (8.425) 
Constant -915.521 100.116 -1,609.873 
 (791.880) (1,156.754) (1,339.324) 
    
Observations 515 225 290 
Deals 93 43 50 
R-squared 0.0857 0.247 0.101 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Regressions with target EBT per PPE as dependent variable; see equation (1). For variable descriptions and 
data sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are esti-
mated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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Hence, this dependent variable does not give further evidence to the profit shifting effect – 
which presumably is found in the previous subsections – and we cannot add support to Hypoth-
esis 3. Regarding control variables, another determinant of EBT per PPE should be economic 
activity. Indeed we show that non-PPE assets and turnover have a positive and significant effect 
on this dependent variable, though only in Specification 2.  
5.4. Extensions 
We extend our analysis by considering thin capitalization or earnings stripping rules and trans-
fer pricing documentation rules at target level in Table 6 to Table 8 in the Appendix. Thin 
capitalization rules or earnings stripping rules may effectively hinder profit shifting activities 
at target-level by limiting or penalizing the deduction of interest payments. Whereas thin capi-
talization rules limit or penalize interest deduction if the debt financing exceeds a certain debt 
to capital ratio earnings stripping rules apply in case of an excessive interest to earnings ratio. 
Transfer pricing documentation rules require detailed information on the height of intra-group 
transfer prices which make profit shifting obvious. We run separate regressions for the coun-
tries, where transfer pricing documentation rules exist (Specifications 1 in Table 6 to Table 8), 
thin capitalization or earnings stripping rules exist (Specifications 2) or both kinds of rules exist 
(Specifications 3). Table 6 shows that the interaction of 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 and 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 turns insig-
nificant in the analysis of PPE in case of transfer pricing documentation rules or if both kinds 
of rules are applied by the respective country (Specifications 1 and 3). This may indicate that 
they are, at least to a certain extent, effective in preventing profit shifting. However, for thin 
capitalization or earnings stripping rules alone (Specification 2), the results slightly indicate 
that even in countries which have such rules, profit shifting may still be possible (PPE still 
increases with the tax rate after acquisitions). A possible explanation for this effect could be a 
limited effectiveness of those rules. Thin capitalization rules, e.g., may be compensated by set-
ting high interest rates (Schindler and Schjelderup (2016)). For the other two dependent varia-
bles, the effect stays insignificant (Table 7 and Table 8).  
We also vary the acquisition date, i.e., we rerun the above regressions modelling the acquisition 
dummy as if the acquisition would have happened in the second to fifth year before respectively 
in the first to fourth year after the actual acquisition year. This investigation is a consequence 
of the graphs shown above, which raise concerns about whether there is a common trend of 
targets before the acquisition independent of whether they are then acquired by CFC rule or 
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non-CFC rule MNEs. The results for targets acquired by non-CFC rule MNEs are shown in 
Table 9 to Table 14 in the Appendix. For PPE, we find the effect (increasing investment in 
high-tax targets bought by non-CFC rule MNEs) also if we consider the second year before the 
acquisition as if it would be the year, where the acquisition took place (see Specification 4 in 
Table 9). One possible explanation could be an anticipation of the acquisition, which may lead 
to an increase of investment already before the acquisition, because future profit shifting op-
portunities are taken into account. This, however, would still be in line with our overall assump-
tion about the effect of acquisitions and CFC rules. In addition, we also find a significant effect 
for the first year after the acquisition (see Specification 1 in Table 10) which may indicate that 
the investment effect after acquisitions increases over time. For financial revenues, as for the 
year of the acquisition, we also find no effect if we vary the acquisition date, except, surpris-
ingly, for the fourth year after the acquisition in case of CFC-rule MNEs (those results are not 
shown in this paper but are available upon request). There the coefficient of the interaction term 
is significantly negative. However, we are not too worried about this result, since this is the 
only year for which we observe such an effect and it lies considerably far away from the acqui-
sition year. The same applies for EBT per PPE, where we again find an effect for the fourth 
year after the acquisition, but now in case of non-CFC rule MNEs (see Specification 4 in Table 
14). Overall, those extensions with the varied acquisition date support our assumption that the 
effects we observe are actually driven by the acquisition. As mentioned above, there may be 
some potential further aspects in case of PPE (e.g. anticipation of the acquisition) which lead 
to the effect (investment increases with the tax rate) already before the acquisition. This could 
be accounted for in future research. 
6. Conclusion 
We investigate the development of investment, financial revenues and profits (EBT per PPE) 
in formerly domestic targets once they are acquired by foreign MNEs. In our analysis, we dis-
tinguish whether the headquarters of the acquiring MNEs reside in a country with or without 
CFC rules. This distinction is crucial because only in the absence of CFC rules, full profit shift-
ing opportunities are potentially possible. Overall, we find that profit shifting opportunities and 
CFC rules affect target real investment (PPE). The development of financial revenues supports 
the assumption of profit shifting but not of counteracting effects of CFC rules. However, we do 
not find corresponding effects for EBT per PPE. 
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In particular, if a target is acquired by an MNE without CFC rules at the headquarters’ level, 
we conclude the following: First, we show that the effect of acquisitions on target real invest-
ment depends on the tax rate. We find a negative effect in case of a low tax rate in the target 
country and a positive effect in high-tax targets. We discuss that this result may be explained 
by MNE-wide profit shifting opportunities that decrease the cost of capital of high-tax targets, 
once they enter the MNE. Such a decrease leads to relatively more profitable investment pro-
jects compared to low-tax targets that had already relatively low cost of capital before the ac-
quisition. We find that in low-tax targets rationalization effects may dominate and lead to di-
vestment. Second, financial revenues increase in low-tax targets following acquisitions. This 
finding supports the assumption of profit shifting from high-tax to low-tax subsidiaries within 
MNEs. However, we do not find evidence that EBT per PPE increases in low-tax targets (re-
spectively decreases in high-tax targets). 
If a target is acquired by an MNE with CFC rules at the headquarters’ level, we conclude the 
following: First, PPE does not change following the acquisition with regard to the target’s stat-
utory corporate tax rate. Accordingly, CFC rules seem to prevent typical profit shifting, i.e., via 
interest or royalties, within these MNEs. In addition, we do not find evidence that – as a reaction 
to this limitation – these MNEs engage in profit shifting via real investment in low-tax targets. 
This finding supports the assumption that CFC rules are effective measures against profit shift-
ing from high-tax to low-tax subsidiaries within MNEs. For financial revenues, however, we 
find the effect of profit shifting opportunities only for the overall sample and cannot make a 
clear distinction between CFC rule and non-CFC rule MNEs.  
Our paper contributes to tax research in two ways. First, by considering PPE, financial revenues 
and EBT per PPE as different dependent variables, we show the whole picture of profit shifting 
within one sample. Since our estimates for two of those dependent variables at least partly con-
firm our hypotheses, we can be more certain that generally profit shifting is indeed conducted 
after such acquisitions. Second, by investigating the effect of CFC rules on target investment 
after acquisitions, we contribute to the understanding of tax effects in this specific form of FDI.  
Our results may also be of interest for tax policy makers, because – by analyzing the effect of 
CFC rules on profit shifting – we study an anti tax avoidance measure that is addressed in the 
OECD BEPS project (OECD/G20 (2015)) and in an EU directive (European Council (2016)), 
which aims at CFC rule implementation to tackle profit shifting of MNEs. Further, we elaborate 
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that such a measure may however distort real investment decisions in targets following acqui-
sitions, which policy makers should be aware of when implementing such rules. 
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Appendix 
Table 6: Effect of acquisitions on target PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; anti-avoidance measures at target-
level). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Transfer pricing docu-
mentation rules 
Thin capitalization / 
earnings stripping rules 
Transfer pricing docu-
mentation rules and thin 
capitalization / 
earnings stripping rules  
    
postMAyear -1.275* -1.057** -1.168 
 (0.745) (0.491) (0.749) 
TarSTR -2.742 -2.246 -2.702 
 (2.711) (3.203) (3.258) 
postMAyear#TarSTR 3.762 3.264** 3.316 
 (2.585) (1.645) (2.627) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 0.492*** 0.418*** 0.479*** 
 (0.162) (0.117) (0.154) 
TarLoss_lag 0.086 0.052 0.074 
 (0.120) (0.133) (0.121) 
lnTarGDP 8.513 6.197 7.121 
 (6.797) (5.430) (8.188) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -7.022 -4.727 -5.669 
 (6.430) (5.043) (7.441) 
TarGDP_growth -0.056* -0.011 -0.062* 
 (0.033) (0.024) (0.035) 
TarCorruption -0.372 -0.754 -0.485 
 (0.407) (0.491) (0.425) 
Constant -158.959 -116.294 -134.494 
 (120.970) (100.153) (152.249) 
    
Observations 512 577 481 
Deals 74 84 69 
R-squared 0.224 0.209 0.216 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Regressions with target PPE (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see equation (1). For variable descrip-
tions and data sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and 
are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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Table 7: Effect of acquisitions on target financial revenues (Non-CFC rule MNEs; anti-avoidance 
measures at target-level). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Transfer pricing docu-
mentation rules 
Thin capitalization / 
earnings stripping rules 
Transfer pricing docu-
mentation rules and thin 
capitalization / 
earnings stripping rules  
    
postMAyear 1.801 2.338 1.739 
 (3.636) (1.709) (5.662) 
TarSTR 11.372 8.873 11.645 
 (12.197) (12.773) (16.844) 
postMAyear#TarSTR -7.389 -9.306 -7.082 
 (11.915) (6.519) (18.566) 
lnTarPPE 0.237 0.157 0.358 
 (0.243) (0.198) (0.244) 
TarLoss_lag -0.901 -0.605 -0.845 
 (0.763) (0.642) (0.876) 
lnTarGDP -15.335 -19.801 -16.176 
 (35.917) (17.169) (78.318) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 14.819 16.640 15.593 
 (36.781) (16.258) (76.147) 
TarGDP_growth 0.065 0.068 0.064 
 (0.132) (0.103) (0.200) 
TarCorruption -0.158 0.398 0.111 
 (2.814) (2.660) (6.646) 
TarInflation -0.122 0.019 -0.255 
 (0.153) (0.158) (0.296) 
Constant 282.437 390.185 299.268 
 (625.275) (320.639) (1,412.607) 
    
Observations 248 286 227 
Deals 38 46 35 
R-squared 0.113 0.0914 0.109 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Regressions with target financial revenues (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see equation (1). For vari-
able descriptions and data sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed 
effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
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Table 8: Effect of acquisitions on target EBT per PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; anti-avoidance measures at 
target-level). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Transfer pricing docu-
mentation rules 
Thin capitalization / 
earnings stripping rules 
Transfer pricing docu-
mentation rules and thin 
capitalization / 
earnings stripping rules  
    
postMAyear -5.054 -1.708 -5.354 
 (12.028) (4.113) (37.436) 
TarSTR 18.295 34.095* 15.838 
 (285.128) (18.229) (51.026) 
postMAyear#TarSTR 27.028 15.953 29.554 
 (38.774) (15.544) (120.818) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 1.495 1.931** 1.178 
 (1.555) (0.834) (1.164) 
lnTarEmployees -0.729 -1.203 0.020 
 (2.845) (1.827) (3.190) 
lnTarTurnover 2.445 2.295* 2.308** 
 (2.029) (1.192) (0.922) 
TarLoss_lag 0.287 -0.118 0.048 
 (4.568) (2.524) (5.391) 
lnTarGDP -25.021 -22.873 -13.323 
 (912.821) (39.726) (561.708) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 11.825 17.830 0.641 
 (1,255.897) (38.951) (531.278) 
TarGDP_growth 0.110 0.092 0.090 
 (2.841) (0.126) (0.667) 
TarCorruption -0.199 -3.024 1.264 
 (118.314) (4.777) (31.128) 
Constant 511.064 380.946 302.908 
 (12,352.062) (712.575) (10,154.877) 
    
Observations 183 211 173 
Deals 34 39 31 
R-squared 0.218 0.212 0.210 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES 
Regressions with target EBT per PPE as dependent variable; see equation (1). For variable descriptions and data 
sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are estimated 
using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respec-
tively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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Table 9: Effect of acquisitions on target PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; variation of acquisition date (as if it 
had happened in an earlier year)). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 5 years before ac-
quisition 
4 years before ac-
quisition 
3 years before 
acquisition 
2 years before 
acquisition 
     
postMAyear_m5 -0.351    
 (0.884)    
postMAyear_m4  -0.678   
  (0.879)   
postMAyear_m3   -0.697  
   (0.780)  
postMAyear_m2    -0.921 
    (0.571) 
TarSTR -4.367 -4.601 -4.888 -4.251 
 (4.237) (3.503) (3.422) (3.055) 
postMAyear_m5#TarSTR 1.453    
 (2.532)    
postMAyear_m4#TarSTR  2.411   
  (2.560)   
postMAyear_m3#TarSTR   3.182  
   (2.419)  
postMAyear_m2#TarSTR    3.356* 
    (1.866) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 0.417*** 0.424*** 0.422*** 0.424*** 
 (0.112) (0.114) (0.122) (0.114) 
TarLoss_lag 0.060 0.049 0.031 0.054 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.120) (0.124) 
lnTarGDP 7.504 7.791 8.289* 7.977 
 (5.874) (5.651) (4.950) (5.147) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -6.212 -6.421 -6.816 -6.520 
 (5.604) (5.383) (4.686) (4.833) 
TarGDP_growth -0.022 -0.027 -0.031 -0.026 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
TarCorruption -0.225 -0.252 -0.273 -0.295 
 (0.552) (0.532) (0.576) (0.529) 
Constant -137.007 -142.792 -152.710* -147.050 
 (103.949) (101.343) (88.208) (92.845) 
     
Observations 622 622 622 622 
Deals 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.192 0.194 0.204 0.199 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regressions with target PPE (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see equation (1). For variable descrip-
tions and data sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and 
are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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Table 10: Effect of acquisitions on target PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; variation of acquisition date (as if 
it had happened in a later year)). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1 year after acqui-
sition 
2 years after acqui-
sition 
3 years after ac-
quisition 
4 years after ac-
quisition 
     
postMAyear_p1 -1.292    
 (0.851)    
postMAyear_p2  -1.641   
  (1.092)   
postMAyear_p3   -1.180  
   (1.856)  
postMAyear_p4    -0.140 
    (3.453) 
TarSTR -3.909 -3.901 -3.517 -3.350 
 (2.986) (3.191) (3.346) (3.080) 
postMAyear_p1#TarSTR 4.435*    
 (2.592)    
postMAyear_p2#TarSTR  5.057   
  (3.656)   
postMAyear_p3#TarSTR   3.311  
   (6.978)  
postMAyear_p4#TarSTR    -2.197 
    (13.434) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 0.406*** 0.399*** 0.407*** 0.418*** 
 (0.121) (0.124) (0.115) (0.111) 
TarLoss_lag 0.047 0.036 0.059 0.065 
 (0.123) (0.131) (0.129) (0.128) 
lnTarGDP 8.118 8.600* 7.746 7.771 
 (4.996) (5.067) (5.219) (5.339) 
lnTarGDP_percapita -6.643 -7.118 -6.438 -6.515 
 (4.649) (4.639) (4.807) (5.009) 
TarGDP_growth -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.019 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) 
TarCorruption -0.243 -0.240 -0.215 -0.236 
 (0.568) (0.558) (0.572) (0.523) 
Constant -149.460* -157.732* -141.322 -141.381 
 (90.358) (92.386) (94.750) (96.133) 
     
Observations 622 622 622 622 
Deals 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.200 0.202 0.195 0.195 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regressions with target PPE (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see equation (1). For variable descrip-
tions and data sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and 
are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
 
  
37 / 42 
 
Table 11: Effect of acquisitions on target financial revenues (Non-CFC rule MNEs; variation of acquisi-
tion date (as if it had happened in an earlier year)). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 5 years before ac-
quisition 
4 years before ac-
quisition 
3 years before 
acquisition 
2 years before 
acquisition 
     
postMAyear_m5 -2.016    
 (4.114)    
postMAyear_m4  0.979   
  (2.516)   
postMAyear_m3   1.127  
   (1.806)  
postMAyear_m2    1.658 
    (1.634) 
TarSTR 0.545 6.077 5.823 8.924 
 (11.366) (9.666) (9.805) (9.693) 
postMAyear_m5#TarSTR 6.753    
 (11.811)    
postMAyear_m4#TarSTR  -1.238   
  (7.048)   
postMAyear_m3#TarSTR   -1.838  
   (5.565)  
postMAyear_m2#TarSTR    -5.540 
    (5.227) 
lnTarPPE 0.010 -0.017 -0.020 0.022 
 (0.209) (0.196) (0.188) (0.203) 
TarLoss_lag -0.618 -0.605 -0.645 -0.576 
 (0.636) (0.663) (0.659) (0.620) 
lnTarGDP -9.312 -11.614 -11.793 -14.321 
 (17.566) (16.819) (15.696) (15.369) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 7.825 9.684 9.779 11.852 
 (17.962) (16.792) (15.751) (15.693) 
TarGDP_growth 0.089 0.098 0.104 0.102 
 (0.092) (0.088) (0.090) (0.087) 
TarCorruption -0.391 -0.126 -0.019 0.078 
 (2.095) (2.029) (1.883) (1.914) 
TarInflation -0.017 -0.000 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.123) (0.121) (0.123) (0.117) 
Constant 190.355 233.178 237.210 285.380 
 (304.111) (299.437) (277.790) (268.598) 
     
Observations 314 314 314 314 
Deals 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.0742 0.0775 0.0777 0.0764 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regressions with target financial revenues (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see equation (1). For vari-
able descriptions and data sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed 
effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
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Table 12: Effect of acquisitions on target financial revenues (Non-CFC rule MNEs; variation of acquisi-
tion date (as if it had happened in a later year)). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1 year after acqui-
sition 
2 years after acqui-
sition 
3 years after ac-
quisition 
4 years after ac-
quisition 
     
postMAyear_p1 1.838    
 (1.840)    
postMAyear_p2  1.558   
  (3.156)   
postMAyear_p3   4.432  
   (5.088)  
postMAyear_p4    2.993 
    (10.533) 
TarSTR 9.101 6.376 6.586 6.131 
 (10.204) (9.800) (8.977) (9.621) 
postMAyear_p1#TarSTR -8.486    
 (6.323)    
postMAyear_p2#TarSTR  -6.358   
  (10.091)   
postMAyear_p3#TarSTR   -17.284  
   (18.913)  
postMAyear_p4#TarSTR    -10.483 
    (44.321) 
lnTarPPE 0.032 0.008 0.009 0.004 
 (0.221) (0.229) (0.210) (0.192) 
TarLoss_lag -0.596 -0.587 -0.557 -0.581 
 (0.633) (0.628) (0.699) (0.635) 
lnTarGDP -12.854 -12.643 -13.257 -12.118 
 (16.636) (15.859) (14.589) (16.212) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 10.424 10.544 11.137 10.174 
 (16.771) (15.956) (14.788) (16.503) 
TarGDP_growth 0.104 0.093 0.081 0.095 
 (0.076) (0.089) (0.089) (0.083) 
TarCorruption -0.342 -0.163 -0.218 -0.047 
 (1.675) (1.890) (1.714) (1.687) 
TarInflation -0.006 -0.007 0.010 -0.001 
 (0.111) (0.113) (0.120) (0.103) 
Constant 260.106 253.371 264.349 242.334 
 (292.016) (276.978) (256.072) (281.621) 
     
Observations 314 314 314 314 
Deals 50 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.0840 0.0742 0.0805 0.0729 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regressions with target financial revenues (natural logarithm) as dependent variable; see equation (1). For vari-
able descriptions and data sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed 
effects and are estimated using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country 
level. 
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Table 13: Effect of acquisitions on target EBT per PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; variation of acquisition 
date (as if it had happened in an earlier year)). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 5 years before ac-
quisition 
4 years before acqui-
sition 
3 years before 
acquisition 
2 years before 
acquisition 
     
postMAyear_m5 -9.524    
 (26.310)    
postMAyear_m4  -10.582   
  (13.089)   
postMAyear_m3   -9.085  
   (10.933)  
postMAyear_m2    -5.876 
    (7.351) 
TarSTR 47.250 56.735 74.503 79.643 
 (86.587) (64.847) (74.668) (68.243) 
postMAyear_m5#TarSTR 39.065    
 (83.571)    
postMAyear_m4#TarSTR  35.919   
  (42.702)   
postMAyear_m3#TarSTR   21.592  
   (30.125)  
postMAyear_m2#TarSTR    7.287 
    (22.618) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 1.945* 1.876* 1.848 1.762* 
 (1.049) (0.989) (1.127) (1.045) 
lnTarEmployees -2.832 -2.419 -2.408 -2.731 
 (2.095) (2.269) (2.220) (2.372) 
lnTarTurnover 3.206** 3.034** 3.160 3.179* 
 (1.368) (1.508) (2.533) (1.798) 
TarLoss_lag -0.087 -0.392 0.254 -0.354 
 (2.604) (3.111) (3.618) (3.127) 
lnTarGDP -30.703 -26.786 -21.373 -16.810 
 (74.879) (71.591) (65.016) (65.919) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 38.876 35.709 30.036 24.931 
 (73.662) (69.139) (61.826) (63.116) 
TarGDP_growth 0.392 0.306 0.267 0.453* 
 (0.279) (0.267) (0.275) (0.256) 
TarCorruption -24.272 -23.422 -22.851 -22.825 
 (21.554) (20.571) (20.865) (20.073) 
Constant 390.096 314.527 217.480 145.134 
 (1,339.174) (1,293.899) (1,190.997) (1,206.433) 
     
Observations 225 225 225 225 
Deals 43 43 43 43 
R-squared 0.253 0.250 0.252 0.256 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regressions with target EBT per PPE as dependent variable; see equation (1). For variable descriptions and data 
sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are estimated 
using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respec-
tively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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Table 14: Effect of acquisitions on target EBT per PPE (Non-CFC rule MNEs; variation of acquisition 
date (as if it had happened in a later year)). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 1 year after acqui-
sition 
2 years after acquisi-
tion 
3 years after ac-
quisition 
4 years after ac-
quisition 
     
postMAyear_p1 -1.864    
 (11.105)    
postMAyear_p2  5.115   
  (83.421)   
postMAyear_p3   5.927  
   (76.526)  
postMAyear_p4    45.680*** 
    (10.481) 
TarSTR 77.192 80.658 81.287 86.690 
 (59.622) (65.523) (62.484) (53.901) 
postMAyear_p1#TarSTR 14.858    
 (33.904)    
postMAyear_p2#TarSTR  -21.383   
  (268.299)   
postMAyear_p3#TarSTR   -25.297  
   (251.653)  
postMAyear_p4#TarSTR    -183.273*** 
    (42.776) 
lnTarAssets_noPPE 1.940 1.895* 1.958** 2.060*** 
 (1.218) (1.089) (0.996) (0.611) 
lnTarEmployees -2.559 -2.552 -2.556 -2.455 
 (2.143) (2.272) (2.127) (1.513) 
lnTarTurnover 3.084** 3.079* 2.984** 2.958*** 
 (1.461) (1.741) (1.302) (0.584) 
TarLoss_lag 0.113 0.005 0.104 0.353 
 (2.533) (3.280) (2.437) (1.171) 
lnTarGDP -18.673 -16.571 -16.996 -14.932 
 (50.709) (76.293) (69.379) (50.520) 
lnTarGDP_percapita 26.256 22.909 23.252 21.149 
 (48.265) (73.539) (66.820) (45.349) 
TarGDP_growth 0.373 0.391 0.391* 0.384 
 (0.256) (0.249) (0.221) (0.237) 
TarCorruption -22.473 -22.677 -22.801 -24.174 
 (20.238) (20.692) (19.980) (16.085) 
Constant 175.596 154.411 163.342 128.949 
 (942.812) (1,367.920) (1,262.178) (961.954) 
     
Observations 225 225 225 225 
Deals 43 43 43 43 
R-squared 0.249 0.245 0.244 0.261 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Target firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regressions with target EBT per PPE as dependent variable; see equation (1). For variable descriptions and data 
sources, see Section 3 and Table 2. All regressions include target firm and year fixed effects and are estimated 
using OLS panel regressions. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respec-
tively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the target country level. 
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